INTRODUCTION
The objective of the bail system is to grant pre-trial freedom to those defendants whose appearance in court can be compelled by a financial sanction. The purposes of this study are, first, to analyze and evaluate the methods by which bail and the related device of release on one's own recognizance 2 attempt to achieve their objective; and, second, to examine the effects of the bail system on the criminal defendant, by studying the conditions of detention for defendants who do not obtain pre-trial release and by comparing bail and prison cases in terms of results at the grand jury, trial and sentencing stages and in terms of length of time between initiation and disposition of the case.
Serious overcrowding in New York City detention prisons suggested the need for an inquiry into the efficacy of the bail system in that city. This, plus the -cooperative attitude of city authorities and the accessibility of statistical data in New York account for the locale of the study. The focus, in consequence, is on New York problems. However, in their broad outlines, these problems probably are typical of those created in other large cities by attempts to resolve, by means of the bail system, the conflict between the goal of protecting the freedom of persons not proven guilty and the need to secure their appearance for judicial proceedings. The belief that a New York study is relevant to other large cities is strengthened by the similarity of the problems found in New York to those encountered in Philadelphia where the only other recent comprehensive study of bail has been made.'
Method
The study focuses on defendants charged with felonies because time limitations precluded extensive coverage of misdemeanor prosecutions. Information relevant to felony prosecutions was readily available in the docket books kept by the district attorneys in the various counties in New York City. To obtain similar information on misdemeanors, which form a much larger share of the criminal prosecutions in the city, would require individual examination of the thousands of sets of court papers kept on file by the court of special sessions, which has jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases. The statistical sample of 3,223 actions is composed of approximately one-half of the felony prosecutions for 1956 in each of the counties of New York, Bronx and Queens. 4 Kings County (Borough of Brooklyn) was omitted because, for the purposes of this study, the docket book there does not record sufficient appropriate information, and Richmond County (Staten Island) was omitted because of the small number of felony prosecutions there.' Cases in which indictments had been handed down but the defendant had not yet been apprehended and cases considered by the grand jury on its own initiative in which no bills were returned (and consequently the subject of the inquiry was never taken into custody) were not considered because they have no bearing on the problems of bail administration. Merged indictments were taken as one action. Cases in which more than one defendant was named in the indictment were taken as separate actions as to each defendant. Where the indictment charged the commission of more than one crime, the crime named in the first count, which usually is the most serious, was used to identify the action. Where no bill was returned, the crime named in the complaint was used to identify the action.
In addition to compiling the statistical data, the researchers interviewed a group of eighty-nine trial prisoners in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men (the Tombs), the New Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter and the Women's House of Detention. This group was made up of prisoners whose bail amount was $2500 or less and who had been in prison more than fourteen days. The primary purpose of these interviews was to learn the reasons why prisoners whose bail did not appear on its face to be prohibitively high did not obtain release. The interviews also elicited information suggestive of the prisoners' understanding of the bail system and their attitudes toward it. 6 First hand knowledge of the operation of the detention prisons was gained by having each of the seven researchers work for three weeks as a uniformed New York City correction officer. In this capacity, the researchers divided their time among the Manhattan House of Detention, the New Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter, the Brooklyn House of Detention (Raymond Street Jail), the Queens House of Detention, and the Bronx House of Detention, the institutions which house male trial prisoners in New York City.
Additional information was obtained through courtroom observation and interviews with judges, defense lawyers, district attorneys, bondsmen, Correction Department personnel, clerks, Legal Aid Society personnel, and others associated with the administration of the criminal law in New York City.
BAIL-SETTING PRACTICES

The Right to Bail
Two distinct propositions are sometimes confused in referring to the "right to bail." The first is that there is an absolute right to have bail set in all non-capital cases before conviction. The second is that the amount of bail must not be excessive. The first of these rights has, from the time of the First Congress, continuously been secured in the federal courts, originally by statute 7 and presently by rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, "A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail." 8 In most states this right is secured by a constitutional 6. The interviews were conducted between July 17 and August 9, 1957. The sample consists of 75% of all defendants in the three institutions who fell within the stated category during that period. The particular subjects were selected at random from those whose commitment papers indicated that they fell within the category. Interviews were conducted in the barber shops or day rooms of the cell blocks. The selection process was explained to each subject and they were told that they were not required to consent to be interviewed. Four prisoners chose not to be interviewed. The eighty-nine who participated were very cooperative and seemed to be forthright in their answers. The interviews lasted from twenty to thirty minutes. The prisoner and one interviewer talked informally with each other while another interviewer recorded relevant data. Inconsistent questions were asked to test credibility. The interviewers believe the responses herein published are reasonably credible. 
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106 provision, stating in substance that all non-capital cases shall be bailable before conviction,' which provisions have been construed to mean that bail in such cases is a matter of right. 10 The United States Constitution and the New York Constitution have no such provisions." The second right, that bail not be excessive, is protected against federal encroachment by the eighth amendment which states, in the same words as the English Bill of Rights, "excessive bail shall not be required," " and against state encroachment by parallel provisions in most state constitutions.' In New York, this provision is contained in article 1, section 5 of the constitution. It has sometimes been suggested that the constitutional right that bail not be excessive implies the existence of a right to be admitted to bail in all non-capital criminal cases.' 4 The point has never been litigated as to the United States Constitution because while that instrument itself does not speak to the issue, there has always been a federal statute or rule of court guaranteeing admission to bail in all such cases.' 5 However, a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the eighth amendment does-not confer a right to be admitted to bail in deportation cases appears to support the cbnclusion that in any federal case this right is purely statutory." In New York, 9 . E.g., Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 29; N.J. CoNsT. art. 1, para. 11. 10. E.g., Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S.D. 378, 204 N.W. 999 (1925) ; Cf. State v. Biehl, 136 N.J.L. 82, 54 A,2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1947) .
11. The constitutions of nine states do not contain this provision: Georgia, Maine Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. However, all of these states have constitutional provisions against excessive bail. In Maine, the constitution provides that no person accused of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail. Ma. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10. In that state and in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the right to bail in non-capital cases is clearly conferred by statute. MZ Ri. S'Ar. ANN. c. 126, § 17 (1954) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 276, § 42 (1956) ; N. HAmp. Rzv. STiA'. ANN. c. 597, § 1 (1953) . In Maryland a statute provides that trial magistrates shall take from the accused his recognizance with sufficient surety conditioned upon his appearance in court to answer such charges, and in default of the accused entering into such recognizance the magistrate shall commit him to jail. MD. ANN. CODE art. 52, § 13(b) (1951) . The scope of the right to bail under this statute appears not to have been litigated. In Georgia, a statute providing that all non-capital felonies are bailable, GA. CODE ANN. § 27:901 (1953) , has been construed by the Georgia Supreme Court as granting a right to bail in all noncapital crimes. Newsome v. Scott, 151 Ga. 639, 107 S.E. 854 (1921) S. 524 (1952) . In this case enemy aliens who were detained pending final determination on deportation and who were denied bail by the Attorney General under the Internal Security Act, contended that their rights under the eighth amendment had been violated. In rejecting this contention Reed, J., writing for the Court, stated: "The contention is also advanced that the Eighth Amendment to which, in common with the federal government but unlike most states, has no specific constitutional grant of the right to be admitted to bail, the Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison 7 upheld the constitutionality of a statute, section 553 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which makes bail a matter of right in misdemeanor cases but discretionary in felony cases. Article 1, section 5 of the New York Constitution was read narrowly to prohibit excessive bail only and not to prohibit the complete denial of bail in felony cases at the sound discretion of the court.
Denial of bail under this statute is not appealable and may be reviewed only by habeas corpus proceedings)
But the court's discretion to deny bail has been strictly construed. With one possible exception, 9 denial has been upheld by appellate courts only where defendant had previously fled from criminal prosecution; 'o denial has the Constitution... compels the allowance of bail in a reasonable amount... . The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept ....
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases." Id. at 544-46.
In a vigorous dissent, Black, J. wrote: "The amendment is thus [by the interpretation adopted by the majority] reduced below the level of a pious admonition. Maybe the literal language of the framers lends itself to this weird, devitalizing interpretation when scrutinized with a hostile eye. But at least until recently, it has been the judicial practice to give a broad, liberal interpretation to those provisions of the Bill of Rights obviously designed to protect the individual from governmental oppression. I would follow that practice here. The Court refuses to do so because (1) the English Bill of Rights 'has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases . . .' and (2) 'in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death.' As to (1): The Eighth Amendment is in the American Bill of Rights of 1789, not the English Bill of Rights of 1689. And it is well known that our Bill of Rights was written and adopted to guarantee Americans greater freedom than had been enjoyed by their ancestors who had been driven from Europe by persecution... As to (2) : It is true bail has frequently been denied in this country 'when the punishment may be death.' I fail to see where the Court's analogy between deportation and the death penalty advances its argument unless it is also analogizing the offense of, indoctrinating talk to the crime of first degree murder." Id. at 556-57. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Burton also dissented.
17. 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498 (1943 ). 18. Ibid. 19. In People ex tel. Fraser v. Britt, 289 N.Y. 614, 43 N.E.2d 836 (1942 , the Court of Appeals affirmed, without opinion, the denial of a petition for habeas corpus brought on behalf of a defendant under indictment for abortion and manslaughter. In Shapiro, where the defendant was under indictment for extortion, the district attorney showed, at a hearing on the bail application, that the defendant had a record of seven convictions; that while free on bail pending appeal after one of them, he had failed to appear, remaining a fugitive for one year; and that if convicted in the present case, he would be subject to life imprisonment as a fourth felony offender. The Court of Appeals affirmed denial of bail.
The view taken by the Court of Appeals in Shapiro is supported both by the plain meaning and the historical background of article 1, section 5. In England the enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1689 which prohibited excessive bail ' was not regarded as enlarging the class of cases in which bail might be allowed.3 The cases which were bailable continued to be governed by the Statute of Westminster the First, which in 1275 had grouped prisoners in two categories; in one category bail was a matter of right, in the other (which included some prisoners held for non-capital crimes) bail was not allowed.
2 " Neither did the First Congress, which adopted the eighth amendment, regard it as extending the right to bail to all non-capital crimes, for that same Congress felt it necessary to include in the Judiciary Act specific legislation directed at achieving that purpose. 5 The identical words in the New York Constitution probably were not expected to have any different effect than they had had in the Bill of Rights and in the eighth amendment.
Although the decision upholding the constitutionality of section 553 does not, therefore, appear improper, the desirability of such a limitation is subject to doubt. Appellate review is not likely to provide satisfactory protection against arbitrary denial of bail. The harm caused by such a denial may be irremediable by the time a reversal is obtained. This, in addition to the cost involved in bringing the appeal, may deter defendants from seeking reviev of bail denials. Therefore, there is no effective guaranty that appellate court standards process of law nor abridge his privileges and immunities under the fourteenth amendment. In Mott, supra defendant left the country after becoming the subject of a criminal investigation and did not return voluntarily after learning that he had been indicted.
21 for denial of bail will be observed by magistrates and trial judges. 2 8 The resulting possibility that some abuses will go uncorrected may have been justified in earlier times-when primitive communications made successful flight from the jurisdiction relatively easy-in order to maintain a hold on those defendants who appeared likely to flee. However, modem police methods and rapid communications have so reduced the difficulty of apprehending fugitives that the restriction imposed by the New York statute now appears to be needless. The federal government and other states apparently have been satisfied that granting bail as of right in all non-capital cases does not impair the efficient prosecution of criminal cases. It is to be doubted that there is any uniqueness in the New York law enforcement situation sufficient to justify that state's failure to achieve the more liberal position adopted in other jurisdictions. It is therefore suggested that action be taken, either by way of constitutional amendment or legislation, to extend the right to bail to all non-capital cases.
Magistrates' Jurisdiction To Admit to Bail
In addition to the basic limitation upon the right to bail discussed above, statutes prohibit the magistrate from admitting to bail many defendants who have criminal records. This limitation is probably of greater practical significance since the discretionary power to deny bail in felony cases apparently is seldom exercised.
Section 552 (a) of the Criminal Code requires that prior to admission to bail every person arrested on a felony charge or for any of a list of specified misdemeanors and offenses 2 be fingerprinted, that his previous criminal 26. An attempt to remove from office a magistrate who had arbitrarily denied bail was unsuccessful. American Civil Liberties Union v. McAdoo, 229 App. Div. 511, 242 N.Y. Supp. 696 (1st Dep't 1930) .
27. This impression was voiced by Judge McAvoy of the supreme court, dissenting in American Civil Liberties Union v. McAdoo, supra note 26: "The common practice-even in major felony charges, 'infamous crimes,' after indictment-is to admit defendants to bail in practically all cases, excepting murder in the first degree, and no reason appears here for disregarding this custom and usage." Id. at 514, 242 N.Y. Supp. at 699. One assistant district attorney of New York County, who has had considerable experience as a prosecutor in the magistrates' courts states that the magistrates ordinarily grant bail in all cases in which they have power to do so. Data from which the statistics used in this study were compiled did not reveal whether failure to grant bail was discretionary or compelled by the prohibition against magistrates' granting bail in certain cases under § 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
28. The misdemeanors and offenses specified in § 552 are: (1) using, carrying, or possessing burglar's instruments; (2) buying or receiving stolen property; (3) unlawful entry; (4) aiding escape from prison; (5) jostling (pick-pocketing); (6) loitering in a public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing an unnatural act or other lewdness; (7) carnal abuse of a child; (8) impairing health or morals of a minor; (9) a violation of any of the thirteen sections of article 106 of the penal law, entitled "Indecency"; (10) sodomy as a misdemeanor; (11) rape as a misdemeanor; (12) sale or possession of ampetrine or its derivatives; (13) sale or possession of hypodermic needles or syringes; (14) any violation (as a misdemeanor) of the Narcotic Drug Control Act.
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record, if any, as shown by local police department files, be obtained, and that this record be submitted to the person empowered to admit him to bail. 2" If in such cases the record indicates that the defendant has been convicted previously of a felony or twice convicted of any of the specified misdemeanors or of any two of them, section 552 provides that he may not be admitted to bail by a magistrate, but only by a judge of the county court or the court of general sessions or by a justice of the supreme court. 3 " In order to have bail fixed in such cases, application must be made to one of these higher courts. This section has the effect of denying bail initially to a substantial proportion of defendants, as Table 1 shows. The 3,136 actions included in that table are all of the actions in the sample except for 88 in which bail was never set because the defendants were immediately released on their own recognizance. In 2,384, or 76 per cent, bail was set at or before the defendant's initial appearance in court-in actions begun by complaint, at appearance before a magistrate, and in cases begun in the grand jury, at arraignment on the indictment in county court 29 . If the defendant is acquitted or dismissed his fingerprints and all copies are required to be returned to him or destroyed in his presence. N.Y. CoD4 CRIM. PROC. § 552 (a). For a discussion of the problem of returning fingerprints, see Comment, 106 U. PA. L. Rzv. 303 (1957) . 30 . In each of the five counties of New York City, except New York County (Manhattan), a county court has jurisdiction over felony cases. N.Y. CODM CRIM. PROC.
§ 39. In New York County the court of equivalent jurisdiction is the court of general sessions. Id. § 51.
A court of special sessions for the entire city of New York has jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases. N.Y.C. CRim. CTs. Acr § 31. The supreme court is a court of general jurisdiction, id. § 22, but it rarely exercises its criminal jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by § 552, a justice of the court of special sessions of the city of New York may admit to bail any defendant charged with a misdemeanor in that court. N.Y. Cone CRIm. PROC. § 552. Section 552 also prohibits a magistrate from admitting to bail any defendant charged with a crime punishable by death or with inflicting probably fatal injury on another in circumstances which, should death ensue, the crime charged would be murder. Ibid. or general sessions. 1 Inasmuch as the discretionary power to deny bail in any felony case appears rarely to be exercised either by magistrates or county court and general sessions judges," it may be assumed that the vast majority of the 752 defendants who make up the remaining 24 per cent were not admitted to bail because they were not bailable by magistrates under section 552.
Of these 752, only 115, or 15 per cent were ultimately admitted to bail.m Some few of those never admitted to bail may have subsequently made bail applications which were denied in the courts' discretion. By far the greater number of defendants, however, probably did not apply, many because they believed they would be unable to furnish any bail that might be set, others for non-financial reasons. 4 A few cases of non-application may be attributable to ignorance of the law and inadequate legal representation. When a magistrate refrains from setting bail because he lacks power to do so under section 552, he ordinarily informs the defendant that he is not "bailable." Unless acquainted with his rights by a lawyer, the defendant may not realize that this means simply that he is not bailable by a magistrate, but that the county court or general sessions and supreme courts are empowered to grant him bail under such circumstances. It may be assumed that the defendant who has private counsel zealously striving to protect all of his interests will be more likely to apply to have bail fixed than will the defendant represented by Legal Aid, which, because of its heavy work load is unable to devote as much attention to each client. 5 The authors of this study believe that section 552 places an unwarranted restriction on the power of New York City magistrates to fix bail. The purpose of this restriction is not clear. Inasmuch as it usually causes a delay in admission to bail, the thought behind the section may be that persons who fall within its proscription are likely to be connected with unsolved crimes or to have warrants lodged against them in other places and that the police should have additional time 31. Occasionally bail is set upon application to a magistrate or judge prior to the defendant's first appearance in court.
32
. See text and note at note 27 supra. 33. It should be noted that the sampling is of actions, not of defendants. Consequently, if the same person were named in more than one indictment in 1956 and the indictments were not merged, it would be possible for that person to appear more than once in the sample. If such a person were unable to furnish the bail which had been fixed in one case and were to be denied bail in another case it is unlikely that he would apply to have bail fixed in the latter case.
34. See Table 3 ijnfra and text following. 
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in which to investigate in these cases."
It is possible that in some few cases this delay may result in acquisition by the police of information justifying considerably higher bail than would have been set on initial appearance before the magistrate. This hypothetical advantage, however, seems insufficient to outweigh the very real inconvenience the law causes to the large number of defendants who fall within its sweep. Furthermore, if delay is the purpose of section 552, it might better be cast in the form of a postponement of bail setting for a definite time. As written, delay is an incidental result. Ultimately, the purpose of the section seems to come down to a lack of confidence in the ability of the magistrates to fix bail in certain cases. Perhaps in some areas of the state this lack of confidence is justified. In New York City, however, it is incongruous. Magistrates there receive $16,000 per year and all are required to be lawyers. As a result, the magistrates' courts are staffed by qualified men and women who are well able to set bail in any case which might come before them. Also, the testimony of witnesses, arresting officers and the defendant taken at the initial hearing, if one is held, may provide the magistrate with an insight into the personality of the defendant and the background from which he comes which the higher court judge hearing a bail application may not have."
8
In many cases, therefore, the magistrate is better qualified to set bail. Once it is posited that some judicial officer will fix bail, there seems to be no compelling reason to deprive well qualified magistrates of the power to fix bail simply because the defendant has a criminal record of a particular type.
This study recommends the enactment of an amendment to section 552 to except New York City magistrates from its operation. Such an amendment was passed by the legislature in 1949, 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957' 9 but each time it was vetoed by Governors Dewey or
Harriman, who in no instance filed an opinion to support their action. 40. The desire to delay bail setting probably accounts for the vetoes. In response to a letter to Governor Harriman inquiring as to his reasons for vetoing the amendment, Mr. Daniel Gutman, Counsel to the Governor, wrote, "It is apparent that prisoners are afforded ample opportunity to apply for and have bail fixed. The major portion of our law enforcement authorities are of the opinion that the advantage of permitting an earlier fixing of bail by magistrates is outweighed by the disadvantage of removing safeguards that presently surround the fixing of bail." (Emphasis added.) Letter, Dec. 2, 1957, on file in the Biddle Law Library.
ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL IN NEW YORK
The amendment had the support of the New York City magistrates. 4 The interests of the prosecution were protected by the proviso that the district attorney or an assistant district attorney must be present in court and have an opportunity to be heard in order for the magistrate to admit to bail a defendant charged with any of the crimes or offenses enumerated in section 552.1
The Source of Bail
The purpose of bail is to compel appearance by economic pressure. If bail deters flight, it is because the defendant is unwilling to forfeit his own money or is unwilling to have friends or relatives who have "bailed him out" forfeit their money. Whether the loss will fall directly upon the defendant or upon a friend or relative depends upon the manner in which bail is furnished."
If a defendant who fails to appear has deposited his own cash, securities or realty bond, the financial loss falls on him. This will also be the case if a professional bondsman has written a bond for the defendant and is able to recover from him on an express or implied contract of indemnification 4 4 by levying either on collateral the defendant has supplied or on other property of the defendant. If a friend or relative supplies the cash, securities or realty bond or agrees to indemnify the bondsman, the friend or relative bears the risk of the defendant's non-appearance. In New York City, almost all bail is given in the form of surety company 44. There is an implied agreement that the defendant will indemnify the surety if the surety is obliged to pay because of the defendant's failure to appear. Badolato v. Molinari, 106 Misc. 342, 174 N.Y. Supp. 512 (Sup. Ct. 1919) . Early cases in other jurisdictions had held that such an agreement, express or implied, was void as against public policy. The theory of those cases was that the bondsman becomes the defendant's jailor, that the government seeks the presence of the defendant rather than the amount of money represented by the bail bond, and that to permit the surety to indemnify himself would destroy the incentive to produce the defendant. Dunkin v. Hodge, 46 Ala. 523 (1871); Ratcliffe v. Smith, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 172 (1877). Consistently with this theory, cash could not be deposited by the defendant as or in lieu of bail at common law. See Badolato v. Molinari, mipra. It is now permitted by statute in New York. Note 43 supra. The substitute jailor theory does not prevail in New York, as stated by the court in Moloney v. Nelson, 158 N.Y. 351, 355, 53 N.E. 31, 32-33 (1899) , "It is the loss of the money deposited, or the assurance that the sureties will be obliged to pay the amount of the bail, that is relied upon to secure the presence of the accused. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a part of the public policy of this state to insist upon personal liability of sureties, for there need not be such personal liability in any case if the accused make a deposit of money in lieu of bail as provided by the statute." See also Leahy v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912) .
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bonds written by professional bondsmen as attorneys in fact for the surety companies. In New York County, for example, no realty bonds were posted in 1956. In the event of a forfeiture, the surety company will pay the bail amount to the court. The bondsman, in turn, is contractually bound to indemnify the surety company. The surety company requires each of its bondsman representatives to maintain with it a substantial reserve fund upon which it draws as forfeitures occur. If this fund falls below a certain level, the company will not permit the bondsman to write any more bonds until he replenishes it. For his own protection the bondsman will usually either require collateral security or proof of sufficient financial responsibility to insure that, in the event of a forfeiture, he will be recompensed by the defendant or a third-party indemnitor.
The eight bondsmen who were formally interviewed for this study all reported that they write bonds only where there is a guarantor who has assets equal to or greater than the bail amount. Apparently there is considerable flexibility as to the nature of the assets required, although savings accounts are favored. Other bondsmen encountered informally in and around the courts also affirmed the existence of this practice, but one stated that occasional exceptions are made when the defendant has "strong ties in the city and a good record." To the same effect was the testimony of Mr. Abraham Newman (at the time a licensed bondsman in New York City) before the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in the Federal Criminal Law of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 84th Congress. 45 This practice may be peculiar to New York City. The Philadelphia bail study did not disclose any evidence of its existence in that city. 46 
Determination of Bail Amount
The practice of setting bail individually for each defendant presumably is based on the view that the degree of economic coercion necessary to overcome the temptation to take flight may vary from defendant to defendant and from case to case. The role of the magistrate or judge who sets bail, then, is to determine the amount of bail which will deter the individual defendant. The appellate decisions on excessive bail admonish him to set it no higher. 4 The duty of
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomnmittee on Improvements in the Federal
Criminal Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1624 Sess. (1956 .
46. Foote, supra note 3. In Boston a higher rate (10%) is charged for unsecured bail than for secured bail (5% 
ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL IN NEW YORK
performing a very delicate and difficult psychological prognosis is thus placed on the judge. Since many judges are strongly inclined to accept the assistant district attorney's bail recommendation, he too shares in this responsibility.
Improper Use of Bail
It is manifest that bail may be used for an improper purposenot to compel appearance, but to incarcerate, either for punishment or to prevent possible future criminal activity. When this is done, there is, of course, no attempt to arrive at a bail amount sufficient to deter flight; bail is set at an amount great enough to preclude release. Some evidence was obtained that bail is thus improperly used in New York City. Some magistrates believe, for example, that young persons accused of crimes should be given "a taste of jail." Recognizing that they may be acquitted or receive suspended'sentences, they try to set bail high" enough to insure that the defendants receive "a taste of jail" prior to trial. In addition, an assistant district attorney in Queens County reported that his office often recommends bail of $20,000 or $25,000 for felony narcotics defendants in order to "protect society," and that $5,000 bail is often recommended for defendants accused of receiving stolen property; the high bail, he *said, was requested not because there was any reason to believe they would not appear, but was "a manifestation of a public policy to control fences" in order to reduce the number of burglaries and robberies. 4 It is fundamental that the state has no right to punish a person until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.-And there is no support in the law for the proposition that a person may be imprisoned because of the speculative possibility that he may commit a crime. 49 Judges and prosecutors, therefore, should carefully refrain from employing bail to accomplish these illegal ends. Few cases of excessive bail ever reach the appellate courts; self-restraint and personal ethics are the only real controls over improper use of bail.
Relevant Factors in Bail Setting
In determining the amount of bail necessary to deter flight, the relevant factors are usually stated to be: the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the character of the defendant and his financial ability to give bail."' The relevance of the nature of the crime rests 48 
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on the theory that because the severity of punishment increases with the seriousness of the crime, the desire to avoid that punishment and, hence, the likelihood of flight increase in like proportion. 5 The force of this reasoning is diminished by the fact that the likelihood of zealous pursuit and recapture are also greater in the more serious crimes. Knowledge of this probably has as great a deterrent effect as does increased bail. 2 The weight of the evidence is relevant in the same way and is subject to the same criticism. 58 The character of the individual defendant and his financial ability to give bail appear to be the two factors which should be given the most weight in determining the bail amount. Predicting whether a person will appear in court is, of course, an extremely difficult matter. Studies done in the related field of predicting future criminal behavior for the purposes of sentencing and parole indicate that only by the use of elaborate actuarial methods or, perhaps, extensive psychiatric examination can a reasonable degree of success be expected. 54 Nevertheless, it would appear that the more a judge or magistrate knows about the strength of a defendant's economic and emotional attachments in the community the better able he will be to predict his likelihood of appearance, and thus make an appropriate choice of bail amount. If the defendant has lived and worked in the same community for a number of years and is currently employed, if he has a family with whom he lives, and if he belongs to a church, or to a union or to other social organizations, he would appear to be a good bail risk, almost without regard to the nature of the crime. If, on the other hand, he has no such ties in the city, he would appear a poor bail risk. Information of this type is often not available to the magistrate or judge who sets bail, although some of it may be revealed by the testimony at the initial hearing. Some magistrates before setting bail attempt to elicit from the defendant information as to his employment status and family background. Most, however, do not. The character of the defendant as a factor in setting bail appears, therefore, to be receiving less consideration than it should.
This conclusion is borne out by the judgment of the researchers who interviewed prisoners unable to raise bail. appeared to the interviewers to have ties in the city sufficiently strong to make it appear unlikely that they would flee. Of the eighty-nine interviewed, all but eleven said they had relatives in New York. Seven indicated they had lived in New York for from two to five years, and forty-nine said they had lived there over ten years. Six said they had been living at the same address for from two to five years and fifteen for more than five years.
The defendant's financial ability to furnish bail is relevant in conjunction with his character because it is unlikely that a defendant whose background indicates a reasonable degree of stability will risk the loss of all his assets or all the assets of his family or friends by an attempt to avoid prosecution. Thus, although bail is not by law excessive simply because it is more than the defendant is able to furnish," but only if it is more than necessary to compel appearance, 56 it would seem that in most cases an amount greater than the defendant is able to furnish would also be greater than that necessary to deter him and, hence, excessive. fixed at $2500 it is only furnished in 37 per cent of the cases. Even at $500 only three out of four defendants obtained pre-trial release, while at $7500 and above only one defendant in seven is able to post bail. The point at which most defendants cannot post bail is thus at $2500, an amount which most magistrates and judges would probably not regard as high. Perhaps what actually happens is that the judge unconsciously evaluates the defendant's ability to raise bail in terms of his own financial status and concludes that $1500 or $2500 is a small amount. To obtain a surety bond in the amount of $1500 the defendant must pay a premium of $70.00.1" Ordinarily the bondsman will also require that the defendant or a third-party indemnitor have sufficient assets to protect the bondsman in the event of a forfeitureY 8 Some officials, in setting bail, may be unaware of this practice, and may set bail on the assumption that the premium is the only financial obstacle. In fact, the need to furnish security seems to be the major stumbling block. The average low-income city dweller works from day to day with little or no savings or equity in property to fall back upon. He generally rents an apartment, and his automobile, if he has one, and furniture may be encumbered. Small savings accounts or reserves in life insurance policies may be the family's only free assets. But the lack of property is not necessarily indicative of a lack of personal responsibility and magistrates should therefore scrutinze carefully the financial status of the defendant lest poverty itself become a cause of unequal treatment.
The comparison by counties of the ability to furnish bail presented in Table 2 indicates that the ability to furnish bail varies by county. In the Bronx and New York bail was furnished in 45 per cent and 46 per cent of the cases respectively, whereas in Queens it was furnished in 65 per cent of the cases. The variance between Queens and New York is probably attributable to two factors. First a lower average bail is set in Queens than in New York. In Queens, 246 of the 467 cases, or 52.7 per cent, had bail set at $1000 or less, whereas in New York only 503 out of 1276 cases, or 39.4 per cent, had bail set at $1000 or less. This difference is explained in part by the lower incidence in Queens of narcotics crimes and robbery, in which bail is customarily set higher than, for example, in forgery, rape or grand larceny cases. A second factor which probably leads to a higher percentage of Queens defendants 57. The maximum premiums for bail bonds allowed by statute are: 5% on the first $1,000, with a minimum of $10; 4% on the second $1,000; 3% on the excess over $2,000. N.Y. CoD4 CRIM. PROC. § 554.
58. See text and note at note 45 supra.
ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL IN NEW YORK
furnishing bail at any given amount than New York defendants is the difference in social and economic structure between the two counties.
Queens is made up of many middle class residential neighborhoods and has fewer depressed areas inhabited by minority groups. As a result, a defendant in Queens is likely to have access to greater financial resources than a defendant in New York. Bronx County defendants demonstrate a good ability to give bail relative to New York defendants at low amounts but a relative inability to do so at higher amounts. This is not readily explained by any apparent distinctions in the social or economic characteristics of Bronx County or in the bail setting pattern there. The statistics compiled in Table 2 suggest that bail is often set without sufficient regard to the defendant's financial ability to furnish it. In no case was a judge or magistrate observed to inquire into this matter, although defense counsel occasionally make reference to it. 5 9 While financial inability is not the only reason why bail is not furnished, it is undoubtedly the most important reason. This view is corroborated by Table 3 , which summarizes the reasons given by the eighty-nine prisoners interviewed, for their failure to furnish bail. Seventeen stated Did not want to bother anyone 2 2 -4
Total 37
Grand Total 89 that they lacked sufficient collateral to induce a bondsman to write a bond for them. This reflects the practice of New York bail bondsmen of requiring substantial security for most bonds."' In addition, twenty-eight stated they could not even afford the premium on a bond." Two others reported that their families needed the money for other purposes and four said that they preferred to use the money for a lawyer. One female narcotics defendant claimed that several bondsmen had refused to write a bond for her unless she could supply 100 per cent cash to secure it.' Thus, financial inability was the reason given by 60. This is a misapprehension. "Any time spent by a person convicted of a crime in a ... prison or jail prior to his conviction and before sentence has been pronounced upon him shall become and be calculated as a part of the sentence imposed upon him.
. 
fifty-two prisoners, 58.4 per cent of those interviewed, for their failure to go out on bail. Furthermore, the reasons given by some of the remaining thirty-seven prisoners interviewed might well be rationalizations, formulated after they had concluded that they could not afford bail. Especially would this appear possible in the case of the two who thought it was a "good idea" to spend some time in jail before trial (they said that they thought judges are more likely to award suspended sentences to prisoners with jail time) " and the four who said they did not wish to "bother anyone." It is difficult to believe that a substantial number of the prisoners who do not furnish bail because of financial inability, could not be deterred by a lower amount, an amount they might be able to furnish. The ability to raise bail is analyzed by type of crime in Table 4 .6 Forgery and rape offenders were the most successful in raising bail, doing so in 68 per cent and 67 per cent of the cases respectively. Again, the frequency of setting bail at a low figure is a major factor. 6 Y Table 6 infra shows that while in 66 per cent of grand larceny cases bail was set at $1,000 or less, only 15 per cent of robbery cases were in that group.
64. This theory is not supported by statistics comparing the sentencing treatment of bail and jail cases. See Table 17 infra.
65. The following crimes are omitted from this table because the samples were considered too small: homicide (17 cases) ; receiving stolen property (36 cases) ; and sex crimes other than rape (45 cases).
66. Many rape cases are not as serious as the name of the crime might imply, thus accounting for the frequency of low bails. A substantial number are statutory rape. Others are cases which are later reduced to assault. In addition, since New York does not recognize common-law marriage, a woman living with a man not her husband! finds that a convenient sanction for settling domestic difficulties lies in initiating at prosecution for rape. judges and prosecutors apparently realize this, and many such? cases are dismissed when the reconciliation is effected. "White collar" crimes included in the above table include forgery, grand larceny and receiving stolen property. Table 5 shows an inherent difference in ability to furnish bail at any given amount by type of crime. The "white collar" " defendants were able to post bail consistently in a higher percentage of cases than persons accused of burglary or robbery. As might be expected, the "white collar" defendants are thus shown to be from more favorable economic circumstances than those accused of burglary or robbery.
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While the character of the individual defendant and his financial ability to give bail appear to be given less consideration in setting bail than they merit, an inordinate degree of importance seems to be attached to the nature of the offense. It has been held improper under the United States Constitution to determine bail amount solely by reference to the type of crime." Nevertheless, one city magistrate purports to adhere consistently to a policy of requiring a minimum of $1,000 bail in drunken driving cases, without regard to factors which might make a lower amount appropriate in a particular case. And another magistrate maintains a check list of all the major crimes showing bail amounts for each. In addition, an assistant district attorney in Queens County reported that his office pursues a policy of recommending a bail amount based on the type of crime charged. 9 Some amounts for first offenders he mentioned for certain crimes follow: Robbery: $10,000. Felonious assault: $2,500. Forgery: $2,500, if of an official record or document. (In other cases bail would vary with the amount involved.) Rape: In the first degree, $2,500. Carnal abuse of a child: $2,500. Possession of a dangerous weapon: $1,000 to $1,500. Sodomy: $2,500. (But the amount will vary with the age of the victim; if the victim is a small child, the bail is higher.) Receiving stolen goods: $5,000. Felonious possession of narcotics: $20,000 to $25,000.
It was stated that these amounts are sometimes varied depending upon the background of the individual defendant. Table 6 for Queens County shows that of the cases studied, bail was usually set at a figure considerably lower than the recommended amount in many of the crimes listed. 70 70. Robbery: recommended amount, $10,000; bail set at $5,000 or less in 74.1% of cases. Assault: recommended amount, $2,500; bail set at $1,000 or less in 59.6% of cases. Receiving stolen property: recommended amount, $5,000; bail set at $2,500 or less in 86.7% of cases. Narcotics: recommended amount, $20,000 to $25,000; bail set at $7,500 or more in only 37.5% of cases. However, tendencies toward high bail in certain crimes and low bail in certain other crimes are evident in each of the counties and in Table 6 for the three counties. Taking $1,500 as "high" bail since at that amount almost half of the defendants are unable to raise bail (and above that amount it becomes progressively more difficult for them to do so 7), crimes in which strong tendencies toward high bail appear are:
Robbery: 85 per cent of cases at $1,500 or higher. Narcotics: 72 per cent at $1,500 or higher. Sex crimes other than rape: 68.9 per cent at $1,500 or higher. Burglary: 64.5 per cent at $1,500 or higher. Possession of dangerous weapons: 61.2 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
Crimes in which tendencies toward low bail appear are:
Receiving stolen property: 33.4 per cent at $1,500 or higher. Grand larceny: 33.8 per cent at $1,500 or higher. Rape: 33.9 per cent at $1,500 or higher. Forgery: 34.6 per cent at $1,500 or higher.
71. See Table 2 supra and text following.
Assault is somewhat equivocal with bail set in 43.1 per cent of the cases at $1,500 or higher. These apparent biases do not necessarily mean that magistrates and judges somnambulistically set high bail for some crimes and low bail for others, without considering the distinctive elements of each case. It is possible that a large proportion of those accused of the high bail crimes have backgrounds justifying serious doubts as to the likelihood of their appearance, and that the opposite is true of those accused of the low bail crimes, and thus even after considering the backgrounds of the individual defendants, the tendencies noted would appear. It is definitely not the case, however, that defendants in the high bail crimes are better able to give bail than those in the low bail crimes. 2 Furthermore, the maximum sentences which may be imposed in two of the low bail crimes are higher than that which may be imposed in one of the high bail crimes. A person convicted of rape in the first degree may be sentenced to an indeterminate term the minimum of which is one day, the maximum of which is life,' and a person convicted of forgery in the first degree may be sentenced to a term not to exceed twenty years. 4 On the other hand, upon conviction of selling or transferring narcotics a person may be sentenced to an indeterminate term of from five to fifteen years or from seven to fifteen years depending upon whether the recipient was older or younger than twenty-one.
5
And when the concentrations shown by these statistics are considered in the light of the fact that magistrates and judges usually lack information as to the character and financial status of the individual when they set bail, and usually do not inquire into these matters, the conclusion seems justified that there is in fact very little individualization in bail setting.
More individualization could be achieved if magistrates and judges were to adopt a policy of inquiring into the defendant's employment, family, associational and financial background and would reach their bail determinations in light of the information elicited. This study also proposes an administrative measure, which, if adopted, should provide the bail-setting judge with additional reliable information of this nature and thus result in a more enlightened choice of bail amount.
The proposal is that one week following setting of bail a thorough investigation of the defendant's background be undertaken for the 72. See Table 5 purpose of revising the bail amount if the defendant consents to this investigation when suggested by the court. The one week delay would eliminate the necessity of investigating those defendants able to raise the bail originally set. In addition to questioning the defendant's family and employer, others, such as neighbors, co-workers and clergymen, would be interviewed. The investigation could be conducted by the probation officers of the courts involved. On the basis of the information thus obtained the investigators would decide whether revision of the bail amount would be advisable. If it appeared to be, they would submit their recommendation to a judge of the court for which the man had been held. The judge, although not bound by the submitted recommendation, should grant it the respect merited by the fact that it reflected the considered judgment of persons who, in a sense, would be experts in assessing the reliability of defendants. The investigation could also form the basis of a recommendation of release on the defendant's recognizance pending trial, if the investigators thought the man so reliable that no economic coercion was needed to compel his appearance. 7 The proposed New York statute is as follows: "Whenever bail is set for the first time in a case, the probation officer of the court or other officer of the court designated by the judges thereof for the purposes of conducting investigations and making recommendations in accordance with this section shall be notified immediately. If, within one week the defendant has not furnished bail, such officer shall investigate the case to determine whether a lower amount would be sufficient or whether the defendant should be released on his own recognizance, and if he so determines, he shall recommend to a judge of the court having jurisdiction for trial of the case that bail be set at such lower amount or that the defendant shall be released on his own recognizance. The judge shall then order that bail be set at such lower amount or that the defendant be released on his own recognizance, unless in his discretion he shall continue the bail at the original amount. The district attorney need not be present when the judge issues his order reducing bail or releasing the defendant on his own recognizance under this section. No investigation shall be undertaken unless consent is obtained from the defendant in question."
At present there is some reconsideration of bail amount, in that trial judges will entertain applications for reduction. 77 This research was unable to determine the total number of such applications but only the number which were successful. 7s Table 10 shows that in the 2,501 cases in which bail was set, 158 defendants or 6.3 per cent were successful in having the original bail amount reduced. It is noteworthy that Queens County had only seventeen reductions out of 488 cases in which bail was set, a ratio of only 3.5 per cent. This, in part, may be a result of the practice in Queens whereby a defense counsel seeking to have his client's bail reduced must first prevail on the assistant district attorney in charge of bail, who, if he agrees to a reduction to a certain amount, will not object when an application for the agreed amount is made in court. In an interview, a Queens County judge acknowledged the existence of this practice and stated that in court the judge "almost completely" goes along with the district attorney's recommendation. This has the effect of at least partially transferring to the prosecutor the judicial duty of determining bail amount, and it detracts from the appearance of fairness and independence which the courts should strive to maintain. However, the smaller number of reductions in Queens is also attributable to a lesser need for reductions there. Queens defendants have a generally better ability to furnish bail than defendants in the other counties and the bails there are somewhat lower. 79 Of the 158 cases in which the original amount of bail was reduced, 102 cases or 65 per cent were able to furnish the reduced amount. This compares favorably with the 49 per cent able to furnish the original bail amount. ' Moreover, had these defendants not had their bails reduced, they probably would have shown less than the average 49 per cent ability to furnish bail, since their applying for reductions indicates they were unable to furnish the original amount. Thus, the desirability of reconsidering bail amount is clear. The above proposal would extend this practice to every case in which the defendant is unable to furnish bail. 78. The docket books from which the data was taken do not record unsuccessful applications. When a formal application is made, a record thereof will be filed with the court papers with the clerk of court. However, since many applications are informal, there is no record of them. Cf. note 38 supra. Table 2 and text at p. 708 supra. Table 2 upra.
See
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Bail Increases In thirty-three of the 2501 cases in which bail was set, the district attorney was successful in having the original bail amount increased on the theory that the initial amount set was insufficient to compel defendant's appearance at trial. Only five defendants whose bail was increased, or 15 per cent, were able to furnish the increased amount of bail. This is in sharp contrast to the 49 per cent able to post the original amount set and the 65 per cent who were able to post reduced amounts. 8 1 Increasing a defendant's bail is very likely, therefore, to sentence him to pre-trial imprisonment. Since this may become a weapon of coercion for prosecutors to wield over uncooperative defendants, judges should evaluate these applications with enlightened skepticism. Unless the prosecutor can show that the defendant is likely to fail to appear if allowed to remain free on his present bail, the bail should not be increased.
ALTERNATIVE BAIL
The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the defendant to post with named officers 82 cash or government securities in lieu of bail.8 When the defendant appears at trial and his case is disposed of, he then gets his cash or securities back from the city minus a small service 81. See Table 10 supra. 82. ".... with the county treasurer of the county in which he is held to answer or to appear, or in the city of New York with the treasurer, or with the magistrate by whom he is so held, or with any other justice or magistrate of the same court, or with the clerk or deputy clerk of a court held by any such justice or magistrate, or with the warden, deputy warden or keeper in.charge of the jail in which he so stands committed .. charge. 4 The posting of cash as bail has two principal advantages: first, it eliminates the services of the professional bondsman and possible abuses that result therefrom and, secondly, it gives the defendant his freedom without any actual loss of money except for the nominal service charge. The obvious disadvantage is that very few defendants have ready cash or high grade securities on hand equal to the amount of their bail. Thus it would seem that only the wealthy defendant is able to avail himself of the opportunity to post cash bail.
However, in order to extend to defendants of poor economic status the opportunity to deposit cash the judges of the New York counties have adopted a policy in some cases of setting an alternative bail. For example, they will set bail at "$1,000 or $100 cash," meaning that defendant may have a bondsman write a $1,000 bond for him, or he may deposit $100 with an officer of the city, which amount will be refunded after trial. This practice is, of course, extremely favorable to the defendant who would have trouble raising collateral for a bondsman. The use of alternative bail is set forth in Table 12 . Alternative bail was set in only twenty-six, or 1 per cent, of the 2501 cases in which bail was set. Furthermore, no alternative bails were encountered in the Bronx sample of 622 cases, and in Queens it was used only one time. Perhaps accounting for its virtual non-use in these counties is the attitude of some officials that it will add an extra administrative burden to the courts. If alternative bails are not set by magistrates because of the fear that magistrates or court clerks will become agencies for the deposit of cash bail, this objection must fail because the duty to accept such bail is imposed upon them by statute. Moreover, as a practical matter, the detention prisons are currently accepting cash deposits of bail with little or no difficulty.
84. The city is entitled to a fee of 2% of the amount of money or par value of the bonds, notes or certificates. N.Y. COD Cam. PRoc. § 586.
Of the twenty-six alternative bail cases encountered in this sample, twenty defendants, or 77 per cent, were able to post the cash bail amount. This compares quite favorably to the 49 per cent ability to post bail " when it was expected that the defendant would have his bail posted by a professional bondsman.
Why do judges use alternative bail in some cases and not in others? If the judge is convinced that a given defendant needs little compulsion to appear at trial, he usually sets either a low bail or an alternative bail. There seems to be no apparent distinction by the judges between cases in which a regular bail or an alternative bail should be used. But it is important for the judge to realize that if he is actually trying to give the defendant a "break," the alternative bail is much more favorable to the defendant than the setting of a so-called low bail. Sixty-eight of the eighty-nine prisoners interviewed were asked whether they would have been able to post cash bail equal to twice the amount that they would have been required to pay as the bondsman's fee for the bail amount in their case. Thirty of the sixtyeight unequivocally stated that they would have been able to raise this amount, sixteen were uncertain, and twenty-two said that they definitely were unable to. The forthrightness of the "uncertain" and negative responses imparts some degree of credibility to the affirmative answers. Thus, it is quite probable that a number of defendants who did not have collateral for a bail bond or who preferred that family money be spent in some other manner could have had pre-trial freedom had an alternative bail been used.
If the judge is satisfied that the defendant will appear at trial with little financial compulsion necessary, alternative bail is recommended as a method whereby the financial burden on a defendant is virtually eliminated. A greater number of defendants will be able to raise this type of bail and, more important, they (or their family) will get the cash back when they come to trial. OWN RE cOGNIZANCE ("PAROLE")86 "In all cases where a defendant charged with a crime or offense is before a city magistrate, and such magistrate is authorized to admit Table 2 supra, with Table 10 supra. More defendants raised alternative bail (77%) than bail which had been reduced (65%).
RELEASE ON
Compare
86. The term "release on own recognizance" as used herein means the release of a defendant without bail prior to trial or sentencing. The term is used in an effort to avoid the use of the term "parole" frequently used in this connection in New York, which more commonly is used to describe the process of releasing a convicted defendant from his prison sentence. The term should not be confused with "discharge on own recognizance," a term used in New York City to denote a quasi-dismissal of pending criminal charges by the prosecutor.
him to bail,' the magistrate may, in his discretion parole the defendant if reasonably satisfied that the defendant will appear when wanted." ss Thus, the committing magistrate at the initial hearing has clear statutory authority to release a defendant on his own recognizance. However, Table 13 shows that release on own recognizance was used in only eighty-eight out of the 3038 cases shown on that table, a ratio of but 2.9 per cent. A breakdown of the eighty-eight cases by crime shows a bias toward the "white collar" crimes and away from robbery and burglary. Whereas thirty-eight of the 607 grand larceny defendants were released on their own recognizance, only six of the 889 robbery and burglary defendants were given that opportunity.9 0 87. See text at notes 27-30 supra for discussion of the authority of magistrates to set bail, especially noting how this authority is limited by § 552 of the N.Y. CoDe CRIM.
PROC.
88. N.Y. CITY Calm. CTs. AcT § 103. 89. Table 11 presents releases on own recognizance as a percentage of the selected felony cases studied since it could not be determined in which particular cases the magistrate had authority to set bail or release. Since Table 1 shows that magistrates set bail in 76% of the cases studied, they therefore did have authority to release on own recognizance in the vast majority of cases. It must also be noted that in addition to the defendants initially released as shown in Table 13 , there were twentyone more defendants released on their own recognizance after they had spent varying times in prison or out on bail.
90. This tendency follows the pattern previously noted. "White collar" defendants had bail set at a low amount more frequently than other defendants, and also demonstrated a better ability to furnish bail at given amounts. See text at note 67 and Perhaps the main reason militating against the widespread use of release on own recognizance is that at the present time there is no sanction if a defendant so released fails to appear. Unlike the bail defendant, the defendant released on his own recognizance has no financial interest at stake. And, although bail-jumping is a crime, 91 it is not a crime to fail to appear when wanted after release on one's own recognizance. 9 2 A New York County grand jury which conducted a three year investigation into bail-setting malpractices and returned eleven indictments against nine persons (seven bondsmen and two lawyers), recommended that the courts release on their own recognizance "all defendants who, consistent with the security of the community and the rights of the defendant, should be at liberty while awaiting trial." 3 However, that recommendation was contingent upon enactment by the state legislature of legislation making it a crime for a defendant to fail to appear at trial after being released on his own recognizance. 4 Such legislation passed the New York State Senate in 1956 but never reached the Assembly floor. In January 1957 the New York State District Attorneys' Association urged passage of legislation similar to the bill which passed the State Senate in 1956.9 The reasons advanced by the District Attorneys' Association for favoring this proposed legislation were: to encourage both the courts and prosecutors to make greater use of release on own recognizance instead of bail; to relieve defendants of the economic hardships of bail; to diminish contacts between defendants and occasional bondsmen-lawyer combinations; and to alleviate the overcrowding of detention facilities.w These reasons, advanced by prosecutors, emphasize the advantages of release on own recognizance over bail. A statute making it a crime to fail to appear at trial after a release on one's own recognizance should be adopted in order to encourage the use of this method of release.
EFFECTS OF THE BAIL SYSTEM ON THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
The Remanded Defendant The foregoing has indicated that the bail system, because of its unrefined selection process, probably jails many defendants whose 
96.
Id. at 5.
appearance could be insured by low bails-in amounts they co'uld afford to furnish-or who would appear in court if released on their own recognizance. This should be of concern to every citizen if only because of the tax burden which results from unnecessary incarceration. Present operating expenses of the New York City Department of Correction are in excess of $4 per day per inmate in detention. For the fiscal year 1954-55 the total operating cost of detention services provided by the Department of Correction was $5,183,857.00.7 Furthermore, since many of these prisoners are the only source of support for their families, their presence in jail adds their dependents to the relief rolls of the city.
The city's financial burden is susceptible of objective measurement. But the disadvantages which may be experienced by the defendant in detention are subtle and more difficult to ascertain. They are better understood by a brief examination of the conditions which prevail in the institutions where trial prisoners are detained.
Houses of Detention "I
In general, the rules enforced in adult detention centers are those normally associated with maximum security penal institutions. In the Manhattan House of Detention prisoners are locked in their cells for approximately eighteen hours each day. When not locked in their cells, they are ordinarily locked in the quadrant, a pen-like corridor on which their cells front. In the Raymond Street Jail, prisoners are locked in their cells at all times except for a one hour exercise period each day. Members of the prisoner's immediate family and his lawyer are the only persons permitted to visit him. When a family member visits a prisoner, the prisoner is locked in a booth on the inside of a brick wall. The visitor stands on the other side. They see each other through a small glass panel and converse by telephone. Such visits are permitted on the five week nights between 7 and 9 P.M. Counsel visits are generally permitted between 9 A.M. and 4 P.M. during the week, and on Saturday morning. During counsel visits, which are held in a room designed for that purpose, an officer is required to be present. All mail to and from prisoners is read by the officers. Prisoners are not allowed to use the telephones personally; all messages are trans- 98. There are four houses of detention for adult males in New York City: one each in Manhattan (The Tombs), The Bronx, Brooklyn (The Raymond Street Jail), and Queens. In addition, there is a Women's House of Detention, located in Manhattan, which serves the entire city, and the Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter, which houses male trial prisoners between the ages of 15 and 21 for the entire city.
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106 mitted by officers, who pare the messages down to their basic essentials. These and other similar security measures result in a pattern of custody which, paradoxically, is more restrictive than that ordinarily imposed on convicted prisoners in sentence institutions. For example, at the Rikers Island Penitentiary, a New York City sentence institution, many prisoners have work assignments which permit them to be out-of-doors a major portion of each day. They eat in mess halls instead of in cells as do most inmates in detention. Sentenced prisoners who are assigned to work in the kitchen, laundry, shops and in the cell blocks of the detention centers enjoy a greater degree of freedom than do the inmates awaiting trial. Administrative convenience is the primary reason for these security measures. A constant stream of new prisoners flows into the detention centers each day. The prison personnel know little or nothing of their propensities." 9 Because some may be problem prisoners, all are subjected to the security measures outlined above. Also underlying their use are overcrowding, the constant turnover of prison population, lack of sufficient adequately trained personnel, inadequate physical plants and the fact that the detention centers, to be near the courts, are located in the heart of the community where it is impossible for them to be surrounded by a natural barrier, and where an escapee may easily lose himself in the crowds. Overcrowding is particularly in evidence at the Manhattan House of Detention, which, with 824 cells, each designed for one man, currently houses a daily population in excess of 1200 inmates. 100 The daily turnover at that prison is sometimes as high as 800 inmates per day.' Similar conditions are to be found in all the detention centers.
Inadequate facilities account also for the fact that adults in detention are afforded little opportunity to engage in recreational activities. 1 02 And, while trial prisoners can volunteer for work details in the institution, 0 3 only a few receive this opportunity. For most pris-99. At the Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter new arrivals are given psychological tests designed to reveal their personality traits. Trained psychologists attempt to segregate the "aggressives" from the "passives" on the basis of these tests, which helps protect the individual from other inmates. This testing is one element of an inmate rehabilitation program inaugurated on an experimental basis at this newly constructed detention center.
100. RPORT at 91. On October 5, 1954 the daily census reached an all time high of 1660 prisoners. Id. at 35 (1954) .
101. See REIoRT at IV (1954) . 102. Inmates at the Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter enjoy a much greater degree of freedom than do the adult prisoners in the other detention centers. In addition their time is largely occupied with various recreational activities. The institution has two libraries, two outdoor and one indoor gymnasiums and each floor has two television sets.
103. State laws directing that prisoners be caused to work apply only to sentenced prisoners in correction institutions and not to trial prisoners in detention. N.Y.
CORRECrIO LAW § § 171, 175 (1944) .
oners, detention is a period of oppressive inactivity. The rehabilitation and recreation programs at the New Brooklyn Adolescent Remand Shelter are manifestations of a more enlightened custodial policy which the Department of Correction is striving to introduce in all of the detention centers.
Trial Preparation
Incarceration under any circumstances imposes certain disadvantages in defending oneself against the prosecuting machinery of the state. If the defendant had been employed, his income is cut off. In many cases this will prevent his hiring private counsel, since most criminal lawyers customarily require a substantial fee in advance of undertaking the defense of a client. The defendant's opportunity to obtain witnesses in his behalf is also greatly restricted. His attorney is confronted with the task of seeking out and conferring with witnesses without the benefit of the defendant's presence. Situations arise where acquaintances of the defendant are reluctant to divulge information' which might be helpful in the preparation of the case when questioned by the attorney, a total stranger. These disadvantages are multiplied when the defendant is imprisoned under the circumstances outlined above. The prisoner's opportunity to communicate with the outside world is trammelled at every turn by prison rules. Confidential communication with his attorney is impaired by the constant presence of a uniformed officer in the counsel room. 1 4 Furthermore, the frustration and boredom which living under these conditions induces, must have a deteriorative effect on the defendant's morale, which, in turn, may affect his desire properly to defend himself, with his despair in some cases resulting in a loss of faith in the judicial system and the entry of a plea of guilty.
If detention populations continue to increase at their current rate,'05 any relaxation of the present high level of security would require considerable expansion in physical plant and personnel. However, if the courts were to impose lower bails and make greater use of alternative bail and release on the defendant's recognizance, the number of persons 104. During the summer of 1957, defendant John Dioguardi, detained at the Manhattan House of Detention during his trial, contended that he was unable properly to confer with his lawyer in the prison's counsel room. Dioguardi claimed that he and his counsel feared that the counsel room might be wired as it was in the case of John "Socks" Lanza while he was detained in the Westchester County jail. detained might be substantially reduced, thus allowing a minimum security program to be instituted within the present operating budget.
Effects of Detention on the Outcome of the Case
That being in jail operates to the disadvantage of a defendant at every stage of the proceedings is suggested by statistical comparisons of bail and jail cases at the grand jury level, in terms of court dispositions and at sentencing. These statistics are presented with the caveat that in addition to the one variable-whether or not the defendant was in jail-that was isolated, other variables, such as the weight of the evidence and the defendant's previous criminal record, are incapable of isolation. However, a system which does not fairly and intelligently discriminate between which defendants shall be imprisoned and which shall be allowed their freedom pending trial calls for correction regardless of whether incarceration has a demonstrably adverse effect on the outcome of the case. 106. This table covers all three counties. The prison cases are cases in which the defendant was in prison at all times until disposition. The 612 bail cases shown are made up of 518 cases in which the defendant was free on bail at all times and 94 cases in which the defendant was released on his own recognizance at all times. Not shown are cases which were initiated by indictment in the grand jury rather than by complaint before a magistrate. In such cases it was not known whether the defendant was at that time at large or in custody under other charges. In addition, the number of cases initiated in the grand jury and transferred to special sessions or not indicted was unknown.
107. In these cases the felony charge in the complaint is reduced to a misdemeanor. Misdemeanors are prosecuted by way of-information in special sessions, therefore no indictment is returned.
108. In this table and Table 16 the bail group is composed of defendants on bail at all times or released on their own recognizance at all times and those in prison ten days or less before being released on bail or their own recognizance. This table includes cases originating in the grand jury as well as those initiated by complaint before a magistrate. Table 16 . These figures tend to support the propositions advanced earlier that jail in itself is likely to produce a guilty plea and that incarceration impairs a defendant's ability to defend himself. But the differences are not large and could be due in some measure to the fact that magistrates often set higher bail, and thus keep the defendant in jail, in cases where they realize that the weight of the evidence is strongly against him. However, the sentencing difference is substantial. Table 17 shows that only 13.5 per cent of the prison defendants received suspended sentences, as compared with 54.2 per cent of the bail cases. Although the unknown factor of prior criminal record may help to produce this difference, the size of the difference, and the fact that the defendant who is in jail usually will have lost his job and thus be deprived of a very strong argument for a suspended sentence, an argument which the bail defendant may have, make it difficult to escape the conclusion that incarceration disadvantages the defendant at the sentencing stage.
Length of Detention
The length of time a defendant will spend in detention is influenced by many factors. In cases dismissed by the grand jury the most 109. See note 108 supra. 110. The bail group shown on this table is composed of those defendants free at all times on bail or on their own recognizance and those defendants who prior to being released on bail or their own recognizance had been in prison thirty days or less. Table 20 . Present practices therefore seem to be accomplishing the desirable purpose of expediting prison cases over bail cases. However, it is not enough to do this if the result still is that a substantial proportion of the defendants remain in detention for an extremely long time, as is the case in New York. It is no answer to this criticism to say that most of the defendants will plead guilty or will be proven guilty and thus will have to serve time in any event, and that their time in detention will be applied against their sentences, or that in some eases the delay is due to maneuvering by the defendant. The detention prisons were not designed for penal service but merely for the temporary custody of trial prisoners. Conditions in them are more oppressive than in sentence institutions. Even if some prisoners do not find detention oppressive, they should not be permitted to languish in detention centers under circumstances demoralizing to their habits of work and personal responsibility.
The solution to the problem of prolonged detention is the standard one for court delay: more judges, full time courts, more careful scrutiny of applications for continuances, whatever their source, coupled with a vigorous prosecution which will, very soon after arrest, confront the defendant with the alternative of pleading guilty or being tried. 
CONCLUSION
Detention is demoralizing and oppressive to the individual defendant. It may also prejudice him in defending himself against the state. Furthermore, it is wasteful of community resources. These factors make it imperative that detention be employed as a means of compelling appearance only when absolutely necessary. Most defendants in detention are there because they are financially unable to furnish bail. Because judges and magistrates who set bail usually lack knowledge of the defendant's background, it seems quite likely that many bails are set at levels higher than necessary to compel appearance. Judges and magistrates should make every effort to avoid this. To that end they should attempt to inform themselves as to the background and financial status of the defendant and set a bail higher than he can furnish only when there is strong reason to doubt that he will appear if bail is set at an amount within his reach. They should be wary of honoring applications for bail increases, and prosecutors should never attempt to increase bail for tactical reasons but only when some newly discovered fact makes it appear likely that the defendant would not appear if bail were continued in its present amount. On the other hand, judges and magistrates should look with favor upon applications to reduce bail when supported by evidence of the defendant's reliability. More liberal use should be made of release on one's own recognizance and alternative bail. Bail should never be used for any purpose other than to compel appearance.
To increase the availability of bail, the right to it should be extended to all defendants accused of non-capital crimes and present limitations on the magistrates' power to admit to bail should be removed. In addition, legislation should be adopted to require an investigation of the background and financial status of defendants unable to furnish bail, in order to determine whether their bail amount should be reduced. To implement the use of release on one's own recognizance, failure to appear when so released should be made a crime. Court delay should be investigated and its causes corrected to the end that those defendants who must be held in detention remain there for as short a time as possible.
